In an effort to understand a "risk," risk analysts and risk managers often consider its constituent parts: What can go wrong (the event) and why (the hazard); what might the consequences be (severity or utility); what the probabilities of the event are; and-should the event occur-what probabilities are associated with each level of consequence (the outcome distribution). Risk communications often focus on some of these constituent parts. Thus, someone might be told that his or her current consumption of red meat (hazard) elevates his or her 5-year risk of stroke (event) to 20%; in turn, 1 in 50 strokes lead to death, 1 in 3 stokes have severe long-term consequences, and so on. This is a highly intellective approach and presents two broad kinds of challenge: understanding the 601442B BSXXX10.1177/2372732215601442Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain SciencesRakow et al. 
• • Ignorance of risks is dangerous, so those exposed to a risk should know something about its phenomenology (cause and impact). 
Three Challenges in Risk Communication
In an effort to understand a "risk," risk analysts and risk managers often consider its constituent parts: What can go wrong (the event) and why (the hazard); what might the consequences be (severity or utility); what the probabilities of the event are; and-should the event occur-what probabilities are associated with each level of consequence (the outcome distribution). Risk communications often focus on some of these constituent parts. Thus, someone might be told that his or her current consumption of red meat (hazard) elevates his or her 5-year risk of stroke (event) to 20%; in turn, 1 in 50 strokes lead to death, 1 in 3 stokes have severe long-term consequences, and so on. This is a highly intellective approach and presents two broad kinds of challenge: understanding the 601442B BSXXX10.1177/2372732215601442Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain SciencesRakow et al. In the first part of this article, we explain the importance of these three challenges (understanding phenomena, comprehending numbers, and the role of emotions). Drawing on research from the cognitive, social, and decision sciences, the second part of our review sets out how to address these challenges when communicating risk.
Why the Phenomenology Matters
Few of us are experts in disease processes, the modus operandi of burglars and thieves, the physics of highway collisions, or the forces of nature that bring about storms; yet we have every incentive to understand enough about these risks to protect ourselves and our property. Thus, a suitable understanding of risk phenomena can contribute to our physical security and economic well-being and, arguably, to meeting basic psychological needs for autonomy and control of the environment. Indeed, one way that people make sense of, and begin to cope with, disease is to learn about their medical condition: its nature, cause, likely progression, consequences, and how it can be controlled (Leventhal, Mayer, & Nerenz, 1980) . Not only do (many) people want to understand risk; arguably we need to understand risk because-put bluntlyignorance can kill. For example, Doll and Hill's (1954) study, which is credited with establishing smoking as a cause of cancer, targeted all male physicians in the United Kingdom above 35 years of age, and only 12.7% of their sample of 24,389 were non-smokers. Such figures shock us now, but without knowledge of a risk, or understanding of the mechanism behind it, there is no reason, or means, to manage that risk. Likewise, many have speculated that deficits in lay understanding of the mechanisms of global warming contribute to the failure to take seriously the risks of severe and detrimental changes to our climate (e.g., Bord, O'Connor, & Fisher, 2000; Clark, Ranney, & Felipe, 2013; Newell, Kary, Moore, & Gonzalez, in press; Ranney, Clark, Reinholz, & Cohen, 2012; Sterman, 2008) -an issue we examine later in our review.
In addition, lack of knowledge or understanding about a risk can, itself, influence the perception of that risk. In numerous studies, Paul Slovic and colleagues have shown that risks which people judge to be "known" (i.e., risks known to science and to those exposed to these risks) are also generally perceived to be voluntary risks which can be controlled. Accordingly, "unknown" (involuntary and uncontrollable) risks are generally perceived as more serious and more in need of regulation (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987) . This means that someone who misunderstands the nature of a risk (e.g., incorrectly assuming that the mechanism behind it is unknown to scientists) may misestimate the probability and/or severity of its adverse consequences.
Why the Numbers Matter
A major purpose in risk communication is to provide information, so that people need not estimate risk themselves and can make informed decisions about managing risk. However, this brings particular challenges because probabilities and numeric measures of outcome often prove difficult to understand. For example, despite the ubiquity of percentages in everyday communications, Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Van Den Broek, Fasolo, and Katsikopoulos (2005) found that the statement "a 30% chance of rain tomorrow" was often interpreted as meaning it will rain 30% of the time, or in 30% of the area, and was less commonly taken to mean (closer to the intended meaning) that it will rain on 3 of every 10 days with conditions like tomorrow's. Those low in numeracy may find it particularly difficult to use numeric risk estimates effectively. Indeed, they are less likely to extract correct information from graphs and plots that quantify the risks associated with medical intervention (Rakow, Wright, Bull, & Spiegelhalter, 2012; Rakow, Wright, Spiegelhalter, & Bull, 2015) and are more likely to make decision errors . And this may be no "tip-of-the-iceberg" issue: Studies in countries with well-developed education systems (e.g., United States, Germany) find that from one quarter to nearly one half of participants cannot change a "1-in-1000 probability" into a percentage (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Weller et al., 2013) .
Such findings highlight that quantified risks can often be expressed in different, though mathematically equivalent, ways: Thus, a 1-in-5 chance can be expressed as a probability (.2), percentage (20%), or relative frequency (2 in 10, 200 in 1,000, etc.). However, equivalent expressions are not always treated as such; therefore, it is often difficult to know which type of expression is best (e.g., for facilitating informed decision making). For example, Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000) found that forensic practitioners with experience of risk assessment and risk management were more likely to discharge a patient into the community when his risk of violent offending was expressed as 2 in 10, compared with when it was expressed as a 20% chance. Those authors' preferred explanation is that these alternative expressions create different mental images, which change the emotional character of the message-suggesting we must sometimes look beyond the numbers to understand how people feel about the risks communicated to them.
Why Emotions Matter
When situations are emotionally charged (or "affect-rich"; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001) , strong initial (anticipatory) emotional responses (e.g., fear, worry, dread) are experienced (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001 ) often leading people to overestimate risk (relative to risk estimates from data). Prominent examples include public perceptions of the risks from nuclear power (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991) and parents' perceptions of the risks from asbestos in school buildings (Rosenbaum, 2014) ; whereas, the data suggest that for these cases, the probability of accident, or cancer, respectively, is extremely low. Research by Slovic and colleagues suggests that "fear" and "dread" drive such overestimations of risks. When a potential for catastrophe is perceived-such as when an event could cause mass damage or many fatalities-a substance, technology, or activity is usually perceived to be "high risk" irrespective of the probability of catastrophe (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981; Slovic & Weber, 2002) .
Emotions can also influence the estimated benefit associated with an activity. Seemingly, people often base their evaluations on overall "gut" reaction such that if feelings are positive, benefits are judged high and risks low, and if feelings are negative, the opposite occurs (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004) . Supporting this "affect heuristic" account, Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) found that providing information about either benefits or risks not only altered people's overall evaluation but also changed their evaluation for whichever entity (viz., risks or benefits) they had not received information. Thus, knowledge that increased positive affect decreased perceived risk, whereas knowledge that increased negative affect increased perceived risk. Lloyd, Hayes, Bell, and Naylor (2001) reported an instance where negative affect (e.g., anxiety) may actually increase the perception of benefit. They found that patients' estimates of the benefits associated with their cardiovascular surgery were significantly higher the day before this major operation than they had been some weeks previously-presumably reflecting that one might make sense of the anxiety associated with impending surgery by focusing on (and even inflating) its hoped-for benefits.
These effects of emotion on risk perception are thought to occur because affect changes how we process information. For decisions about affect-poor outcomes (e.g., money), people use more calculation-based strategies (e.g., expected value calculations). For affect-rich outcomes (e.g., involving adverse health side effects), the outcomes themselves take precedence over probability information (Loewenstein et al., 2001 ). Pachur, Hertwig, and Wolkewitz (2013) found further support for this distinction between affect-rich (outcome-based) and affect-poor (calculation-based) decisions by tracking what information people collect in a laboratory decision task. In affect-poor situations (e.g., decisions about money), participants divided their time equally between acquiring outcome and probability information; in affect-rich situations (e.g., decision about medical treatment side effects), however, participants acquired outcome information more frequently than probability information. The emotional content of labels (as distinct from the event itself) has also been shown to influence decision processes. Sinaceur, Heath, and Cole (2005) found that, while probability information was taken into account when a scientific label was used ("Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease"), decisions about beef consumption were based primarily on their emotional reactions when an affect-rich label ("mad cow disease") was used. In sum, when emotions run high, what is possible takes precedence over how probable that possibility is (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Sunstein, 2002) .
How to Think About These Challenges
There is no magic bullet in risk communication, and so we do not offer a list of one-size-fits-all solutions to the difficulties inherent in communicating risk. Rather, we illustrate what we believe are helpful ways of thinking through the three challenges that we have outlined above.
Phenomenology: Exploring the Relationship Between Knowledge and Risk Perception
Different risks have different causes; therefore, one cannot say, "This is how to explain risk phenomena." However, behavioral science offers a system for testing what helps people understand different risk phenomena, and we illustrate this evidence-based approach via a case study. This shows how behavioral science experiments can inform the design of messages designed to empower people with knowledge of an entity or system that places them at risk. We focus on lay understanding of the carbon cycle, accurate knowledge of which is, arguably, fundamental for understanding the mechanism of global warming.
The basic carbon cycle can be thought of as a dynamic system that involves "stocks" and "flows." A stock (e.g., total amount of accumulated carbon do-oxide [CO 2 ] in the atmosphere) is some entity amount that is accumulated over time by inflows (e.g., anthropogenic CO 2 emissions) and depleted by outflows (e.g., CO 2 uptake by plants). When inflow exceeds outflow, the stock will increase; when outflow exceeds inflow, the stock will decrease; and when inflow equals outflow, the stock will stabilize. Despite their apparent simplicity, research using stockflow reasoning tasks suggests that lay people's understanding of these relationships is poor-even among those with backgrounds in science, engineering, or mathematics (Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012a , 2012b Guy, Kashima, Walker, & O'Neill, 2013; Moxnes & Saysel, 2009; Newell et al., in press; Sterman & Booth-Sweeney, 2007) .
For instance, Sterman and Booth-Sweeney (2007) showed participants a hypothetical plot in which the accumulated concentration of atmospheric CO 2 rises steadily until the year 2000 and then remains stable for the next century. The same participants were then shown an inflow function with CO 2 emissions increasing up to 2000, together with an estimate of current outflow. Notably, current outflow was shown to be substantially below inflow levels. Participants were asked to estimate the pattern of emission inflow that would be necessary to achieve stability in accumulated CO 2 . Assuming a static level of outflow, the correct response is that emissions must be cut dramatically to a level equal with the outflow. However, most participants sketched emissions trajectories that either maintained current levels or increased them-thereby preventing stabilization. It seems that participants reason that the output of a system should "look like" its inputs (Cronin et al., 2009; Sterman, 2008) . Thus, because the accumulated CO 2 stock gradually rises and then stabilizes, people think CO 2 emissions (inputs) should follow a similar pattern. They fail to realize that a stock accumulates its inflows minus its outflows.
In an effort to improve performance on the CO 2 task, some researchers have turned to analogies. Analogical reasoning involves identifying a common relation between two situations and generating inferences based on these commonalities. Analogies can help people integrate the presumably unfamiliar information about the climate system into existing knowledge structures (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012a , 2012b Gonzalez & Wong, 2012; Guy et al., 2013; Moxnes & Saysel, 2009; Newell et al., in press ). This work shows promise, but it can be improved. For example, Guy et al. (2013) tested the usefulness of a "bathtub analogy" whereby participants were invited to think about the stock of CO 2 as water entering a bathtub from a tap ("emissions") and leaving via the plughole ("absorptions"). However, even when provided this analogical context, few participants gave the precisely correct answer. Newell et al. (in press) reformulated the CO 2 accumulation problem as one involving management of personal financial debt. They found that although more participants drew accurate inferences about the relations between debt, money earned, and money spent, there was little evidence of analogical transfer of conceptual understanding to the climate problem. In both of these investigations, there was also some evidence that depicting the relationships between stocks and flows in the climate problem graphically actually hindered performance (compared with only providing a text description).
These studies on stock-flow analogies for the carbon cycle suggest a need for more theoretically driven analogies and perhaps the need for more explicit analogical comparisons. For example, rather than just thinking about the carbon cycle in terms of analogies to other systems, participants could be invited to list similarities and differences between two problems-thereby encouraging consideration of both the surface and the deeper structural or behavioral similarity across different stock-flow analogical contexts (see, for example, Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Gonzalez & Wong, 2012) . Another possible method for improving understanding of the carbon cycle (or other complex systems) is to allow participants to experiment and interact with virtual systems or simulations to learn how the components inter-relate (e.g., Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012a , 2012b Sterman et al., 2012) .
Development of clear methods for communicating the mechanisms of the carbon cycle will permit further work exploring the effect of such interventions on climate change risk perception. Although it would appear self-evident that increased knowledge and understanding of a problem should lead to higher risk perception, documenting such a direct relationship has not been straightforward (Newell, McDonald, Brewer, & Hayes, 2014) . For example, Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, and Grover (2008) found no significant relationship between climate change knowledge and risk perception; Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz (2008) found a negative association; and Malka, Krosnick, and Langer (2009) found that increased knowledge affected concern about climate change for liberals but not conservatives (see Kahan et al., 2012 , for similar results). A comprehensive recent assessment by van der Linden (2015) does, however, find that in a large sample (N = 808) of U.K. residents, people tend to perceive climate change as a higher risk when they have knowledge about the causes of climate change, knowledge of what the likely impacts are, as well as information about appropriate response behaviors. That is, knowledge of causes, impacts, and responses are positively and significantly related to climate change risk perception. Van der Linden suggests that it is this delineation into different types of knowledge that permits clearer assessment of the role that improved understanding plays in risk perception.
Interestingly, knowledge of causes contributed least to explained variance in van der Linden's climate change riskperception model, suggesting that even if the "perfect" method for improving reasoning about the carbon cycle were developed, it may be less successful than interventions that educate people about impacts, perhaps via appeal to more vivid emotion-laden messaging (van der Linden, 2015; Weber, 2006) . Indeed, the holistic affect people associated with climate change explained more variance than any other single factor in van der Linden's risk-perception model.
Numbers: Getting the "Right" Level of Detail
Zikmund-Fisher (2013) set out a taxonomy for categorizing statements about the (un)certainty of outcomes, according to the precision with which they communicate risk (Table 1) . We use Zikmund-Fisher's seven-category taxonomy to unpack some implications of the different approaches to communicating risk probabilities and outcome distributions. One approach to addressing people's difficulties with understanding and using numbers is to communicate risk without using numbers, for example, simply stating what can happen, which of two things is more/less likely, or whether something has a high/low chance of occurring. These three kinds of statement represent the three lowest levels of precision in Zikmund-Fisher's taxonomy: possibility, comparative possibility, and categorical possibility. Such statements serve a purpose, being sufficient to alert people to a risk (possibility), to help people know how to decrease their risk exposure (comparative possibility), or get a sense of their current exposure to risk (categorical possibility).
However, the interpretation of verbal labels varies widely between individuals (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009) , is variable for a given individual (Dhami & Wallsten, 2005) , and is highly context dependent. For example, Wallsten, Fillenbaum, and Cox (1986) found that most people interpreted a "slight chance" to mean a probability of .1 or lower when it referred to the probability of severe life threatening side effects from a flu shot, but everyone in their study inferred probabilities of .1 or above when "slight chance" referred to the probability of an ankle sprain. In addition, overestimating risk is more common with verbal labels than with numeric formats (Peters, Hart, Tusler, & Fraenkel, 2014) . Moreover, statements such as "high/low" or "higher/ lower" risk often imply points of comparison (e.g., high = "above average") that may not be well understood. For example, a pregnant woman may undergo a "low" risk diagnostic procedure (amniocentesis) because a screening test indicates she has "high" risk of giving birth to child with Down syndrome. Yet the U.K. National Health Service estimates the probability of the "small associated risk of miscarriage" with amniocentesis performed 15 to 20 weeks into pregnancy to be around 1 in 100 (NHS Choices, 2015a) while labeling a screening test that shows any probability above 1 in 150 of having a baby with Down syndrome a "higher-risk result" (NHS Choices, 2015b). Thus, even within the context of a single conversation about risk, "higher" may actually be lower than "low."
Quantifying risk for a single event increases the precision of communication, relative to comparative or categorical probabilities. However, the use of relative probability statements that compare risks (e.g., "A is twice as likely as B") is often criticized because it obscures one's risk exposure in either situation (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002) . At the extreme, we might be unnecessarily worried about a doubling of risk from 1-in-a-million to 2-in-a-million. Absolute probability statements are more precise but are not necessarily straightforward to interpret: If my 5-year risk of stroke is 8%, is that "good" or "bad"? This is important, because a sizable literature in experimental psychology shows that people base their decisions on other (more easily evaluated) information when they do not know how to evaluate numbers from a numeric scale (for reviews, see Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Hsee & Zang, 2010) . For instance, Slovic and Peters (2006) found less support for a safety measure that would save 150 lives than for one that saved 98% of 150 lives (presumably, because we "know" that 98% is almost as good as it gets). This is consistent with the notion that, in isolation, it is hard to know how "good" an intervention is that saves 150 lives. Comparative probability statements that give absolute probabilities for two or more risks, and incremental probability statements that specify differences between risks, represent the highest levels of precision in Zikmund-Fisher's taxonomy (Table 1) . These offer better opportunities for comparing different courses of action, but, by themselves, they may not fully address people's difficulties with evaluating the meaning of numbers on an unfamiliar scale. Moreover, while greater precision affords further calculation of risks, this is something that even some highly educated people struggle with (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) , including those in numerate professions such as medicine (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Grayboys, 1978; Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) , let alone those with lower levels of numeracy.
Our review highlights three issues to work through when designing communications about quantified risks: the potential for ambiguity in the message, the evaluability of any quantitative information included, and the numeracy of the people you are communicating with. Using Zikmund-Fisher's (2013) taxonomy, we can see that the prominence of these issues shifts according to the precision of the message. The potential for ambiguity is greatest at lower levels of precision that avoid the use of numbers (i.e., possibility statements; Table 1 ) because language is often polysemous, and at intermediate levels of precision (i.e., relative and absolute probability) because the point of comparison, or reference class, may not be clear. The difficulties of evaluating quantities are particularly acute when communicating at an intermediate level of precision. However, the problem is not necessarily solved by using higher levels of precision (i.e., comparative and incremental probability) because people may still have difficulty in evaluating unfamiliar measures of impact or severity. With greater precision in risk communication comes the responsibility to recognize the variability in, or limits of, the numeracy of your audience-and to know what strategies, tools, and decision aids can help to communicate the particular type of risk(s) that your communication concerns (e.g., for reviews relating to health/medical risks, see Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & Starren, 2006; Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, & Ubel, 2011) .
Research by Peters and colleagues points to the potential benefits of a "twin-track" approach to describing risks whereby risk messages cover multiple levels of ZikmundFisher's (2013) taxonomy. Peters et al. (2009) had people evaluate hospitals from several numeric quality indicators (e.g., treatment survival rate, percentage of patients receiving the recommended treatment). When labels designed to make the numbers easier to evaluate ("poor," "fair," "good," "excellent") were included alongside each number, people made more use of the indicators in their evaluations. Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon, Hibbard, and Mertz (2007) also presented quantitative information about several hospitals and asked participants to select the best hospital to deliver treatment if they had heart failure. Presenting icons (e.g., "traffic light" colors) that signaled average or above/below average values of an indicator encouraged people to use quality indicators (e.g., death rate) when evaluating a hospital, though among those with low numeracy participants, this seemed to encourage the use of arguably less important indicators (e.g., cost).
A twin-track approach can also be used to improve communications that include verbal statements about quantities. Working within the guidelines for communicating uncertainty used by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), Budescu and colleagues found that adding numeric range information to verbal probability labels (e.g., "very unlikely, <10%") improved several aspects of communication (Budescu et al., 2009; Budescu, Por, & Broomell, 2012) . Adding the numeric range information increased people's ability to differentiate between terms (e.g., "unlikely" vs. "very unlikely"), reduced the variability in interpreting these terms, and brought people's interpretation more in line with those intended by the IPCC. This benefit of dual labeling occurred even when people had previously been shown a table giving the IPCC's intended meaning of these terms. Overall, providing messages about risk at multiple levels of precision is an approach with promise.
Emotions: Playing Up Versus Playing Down the Emotional Content
Many risk communications fall on a continuum between "warning" and "informing": ranging from attempts to discourage people from putting themselves or others in danger, to providing information about risks and benefits to facilitate informed decision making. This warning-informing continuum for message purpose is mirrored in a similar affective communication continuum for message emotionality, which is characterized by the extent to which risk communicators "play up" or "play down" the emotional content of a message.
One side of this affective communication continuum reflects the "nudge" philosophy, which works on framing information so as to encourage (nudge) people (perhaps unknowingly) toward particular behaviors or responses (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) . Thus, those presenting messages about risk may capitalize on the effect that emotions have on perceptions of risk (described above) and play up the emotional content of their message-particularly if it is believed that people are under-estimating risk or under-responding to it. Often, for risks to health, safety, or security, this is done via fear-based messages, which use emotive language (e.g., see above for emotive labels such as "mad cow disease"; Sinaceur et al., 2005) . Although these can work, in some cases, attempts to change behavior through "scary" messages or "shocking" imagery can be ineffective-because people can react against attempts to change their attitude or behavior that they regard as "heavy handed" (O'Neill & NicholsonCole, 2009; Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001) . When considering such emotional nudges, it is important that policy makers consider whether this is (ethically) appropriate or whether it represents undue manipulation and a hindrance to informed decision making (Bovens, 2009 ).
Visual imagery is another common tactic for emphasizing risk and is most clearly illustrated by the gruesome pictures that several countries place on cigarette packets (Peters, 2011) . The effectiveness of visual images in changing risk perceptions is supported by data from Keller, Siegrist, and Gutcher (2006) who found that showing people photographs of flooded houses increased their perception of the danger of living in a flood zone (compared with those shown pictures of other houses) even though all participants in this study received information and warnings about flood risk.
Using images to arouse emotions typically lessens the impact of "non-emotional" information that may be relevant to a decision. For example, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) found people's willingness to give money to save endangered animals was unaffected by the number of animals at risk when they were shown photographs of those animals, while people were sensitive to the number of animals at risk when a less emotive representation of these animals was used (dots representing each animal). While such effects are widely reported, Shaffer, Owens, and Zikmund-Fisher (2013) found that including patient narratives in a web-based patient decision aid increased the amount of additional information that people sought out-an effect which was stronger if that narrative was from a patient speaking on video. This illustrates that the effect of vivid messages can be difficult to predict-here, one would have anticipated that "personal" (affect-rich) video narratives would reduce the appetite for effortful decision making (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Sunstein, 2002) .
Understanding the effects of emotion on risk perception and decision making is key to operating at the other end of the affective communication continuum. Here, the goal is to reduce the role played by emotions not only by seeking to eliminate emotive language and affect-rich images but also by seeking to reduce the room for emotions to enter any decision that relies on the risk information contained in a message. One such approach was described earlier, namely, the evidence suggests that making any numbers which quantify risk more straightforward to evaluate increases the appropriate use of those numbers, thereby reducing the opportunity for emotions to drive the decision (Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee & Zang, 2010; Peters et al., 2007 Peters et al., , 2009 ). Studies of health care decisions by Fagerlin, Wang, and Ubel (2005) highlight how the clear presentation of quantitative information reduces the influence of emotive messages and so facilitates informed decision making. Their participants received statistical information in text and read anecdotes about treatment outcomes from hypothetical patients that were either representative or unrepresentative of actual cure rates. Some participants also received a pictograph illustrating the statistical information-which is often an effective aid when communicating probabilities (e.g., Galesic, GarciaRetamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009) . Unlike participants in a control condition (who received no pictograph), the decisions of those given the pictograph were relatively unaffected by the anecdotal information.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Policy makers would not dream of presenting risks to the public that did not have an empirical basis. The same principle should apply to the means of communication that policy makers use to covey those risks to the public. When explaining the phenomenology of a risk, policy makers can often look to research by science educators to inform how best to explain the risk-but for "new" risks, it may be essential to examine, or commission, new behavioral science research to determine what works best. Getting the right level of detail when communicating quantitative risk estimates presents a sizable challenge: Imprecise communications breed ambiguity, but precise communications can be difficult to understand. Our main message, here, is that one size does not fit all: Messages delivered at multiple levels of precision may be an effective means of reducing ambiguity and misunderstanding, and messages need to take account of the variation in numeracy levels across the general public. Finally, the emotional content of messages must be managed: When emotions run high, the phenomenology and the numbers can be expected to take a back seat while emotions drive people's behavior. And while it is tempting to use emotions to drive behavior down a positive route, this will not always work as intended and can sometimes be challenged on ethical grounds.
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